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Allen and Akers: Commentary on Baldwin

COMMENTARY ON BALDWIN
FrancisA. Allen*
Commentaries on conference papers have acquired no stable art
form. Rather, such comments appear to take an almost infinite variety
of forms, ranging from a detailed and conscientious scrutiny of the
arguments advanced in the principal paper, at one extreme, to observations, at the other, the relevance of which are mysterious to the
audience and obscure to the commentator himself. I intend that my
remarks should fall somewhere between these polar extremes, but
some may be disposed to locate them closer to the latter pole than
the former. The burden of my comments will be to inquire about the
condition of and prospects for criminal justice scholarship in the law
schools, given the conditions discussed and alluded to by Professor
Baldwin in his paper.
In an early part of his discussion, Professor Baldwin notes the
extraordinary volume of published commentary on fourth amendment
problems. Although I have not done the counting, my impression is
that the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases has been, for
the last two decades, one of the most frequently discussed issues in
American law reviews.1 At their best, these discussions constitute an
impressive literature - ingenious, comprehensive, properly concerned
about official constrictions of personal privacy brought on by efforts
to enforce penal proscriptions against consumption and by the electronic revolution of our time. 2 The sheer volume of this literature,
however, and the demonstrated readiness of many academics to subject
every microscopic increment of judicial doctrine to exhaustive commentary, may cause some to wonder whether anything remains worth
saying about the subject. To be sure, a market for the literature
exists, as demonstrated by the outpouring of lawyers to continuing
legal education seminars where these and related questions are discussed. Whether the volume of the literature and the concomitant

*Huber C. Hurst Eminent Scholar and Professor of Law, University of Florida College of
Law. A.B., 1941, Cornell College; LL.B., 1946, Northwestern; J.D. (Hon.), 1958, Cornell College;
LL.D., 1980, Victoria.
1. For a discussion of the popularity of constitutional criminal procedure issues for law
review exegesis, see Allen, Introduction: American CriminalProcedure: Why the Dominance
of Judge-Made Lazo? in POLICE PRACTICES AND THE LAW 3-4 (1982).
2. See, e.g., Kanisar, Does (Did) (Sluld) the Exclusionar'y Rule Rest on a "Principled
Basis" Rather than an "EmpiricalProposition"?,16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565 (1983).
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neglect of other pressing issues of criminal justice by many law school
academics comports with the highest standards of university scholarship, is another issue that deserves serious consideration.
The literature to which I refer is not only voluminous, but in recent
years has taken on a distinctive tone. A note of wistfulness, if not
petulance, is conveyed even in the titles of some of the published
articles and notes. Thus, in recent years one finds titles in the law
reviews such as "Frisking the Fourth Amendment, '3 "The Incredible
Shrinking Fourth Amendment," 4 and "The New Law of Search and
Seizure: Castles Built With Air?" 5 This scholarship gives one the impression that a substantial cadre of American law professors hopefully
awaits the second coming of the Warren Court. The absence of favorable eschatological indications seems not as yet to have dimmed these
expectations. To alter the figure somewhat, many of the fourth amendment scholars appear to have defined their role as similar to that of
monks preserving evidences of the true faith in their cloisters until
the dark ages have passed.
These are uncharitable remarks, and to mitigate my wrong, let
me say that the distress conveyed by the literature is comprehensible
and, in my opinion, justified. It is a product of the dominant intellectual
mode employed by the Supreme Court and delineated by Professor
Baldwin. This approach eschews principle and concern for the integrity
of the criminal justice process and, instead, employs a shallow and
mean-spirited pragmatism, intent on securing small law enforcement
advantages in individual cases. 6 The attitudes of the Supreme Court
can be identified in even more blatant and less decorous forms in the
opinions of state court judges. 7 What needs to be noted, however, is

3. Spillane, Frisking the FourthAmendment, 10 HuM. RTS. 23 (1982).
4. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CR. L. REV. 257
(1984).
5. Bevan & Lidstone, The New Law of Search and Seizure: Castles Built With Air?, 1985

PUB. L. 423.
6. Cf. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal
Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 537:
[U]ntil the [exclusionary] rule rests on a principled basis rather than on an empirical
proposition, the Mapp precedent, provided the Court does not overrule or substantially modify it, will remain in a state of unstable equilibrium. The Warren Court
failed in its closing years to provide a principled underpinning for the rule.

Id.
7. Allen, A Serendipitous Trek Through the Advance-Sheet Jungle: Criminal Justice in
the Courts of Review, 70 IowA L. REV. 311 (1985).
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that the judicial attitudes, both state and federal, mirror and replicate
the dominant mood of the community. This fact is significant in defining
the contemporary problems of advancing human values in criminal
justice administration and also in considering the strategies of scholarship directed to the same end.
The impact of the current widespread fear of and outrage over
crime on the decency of American criminal justice has yet to be fully
described or appreciated. Whatever its exact nature, the impact is
great. These fears are surely implicated in the remarkable change of
American attitudes toward the death penalty over the last two decades
and the reversal of popular views toward penal rehabilitationism over
an even shorter period., Only recently have we begun to understand
how inextricably these fears are bound up in our most basic social
attitudes.
Sociological findings suggest no necessary correlation between
crime victimization and the fear of crime. 9 Strong fears flourish among
persons who have never been and are not likely in the future to be
targets of serious criminal aggressions. For such persons, who are
both numerous and influential, crime is feared more as an evidence
of a general collapse of mechanisms of social control than as an immediate threat to personal security. The prevalence of serious crime
is resented because it appears to challenge the capacity of the community to achieve the values that induce persons to come together in
societies. Popular attitudes toward campus disorders in the Vietnam
period, for example, can be fully understood only when this element
is taken into account.
Moreover, current attitudes that elevate the achievement of law
enforcement and devalue the claims of due process of law seem rooted
in dissatisfactions broader than merely those associated with criminal
justice administration. American society, confronted by disappointment, frustrations, and unrealized expectations, has been led to increasing reliance on the launching of deadly force as a favored means
of achieving its goals and overcoming dissatisfaction. This reliance
reveals itself clearly in the conduct of our foreign policy as well as in
our internal policy.
One need not resort to simplistic shibboleths about the relations
of current events and popular attitudes toward judicial performance

8. Id. at 318-22.
9.

E.g., D. LEwis & G. SALEM, FEAR OF CRIME: INCIVILITY AND THE PRODUCTION

OF A SOCIAL PROBLEM passim (1986).
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to recognize that the present is not a time in which much forward
progress in the development of due process doctrine by courts in
criminal cases can be anticipated. If ever a time existed when a criminal
law professor could be reasonably confident that by publishing critiques
of the latest Supreme Court opinions he was substantially contributing
to the advancement of human values in criminal justice administration,
that time is not now.
If, then, the parsing of due process theory can no longer serve as
a sufficient or realistic objective for criminal justice scholarship, toward
what conditions and goals should the new scholarship turn? No one
would wish to dictate the choices that others must make about such
matters. Yet, perhaps, one can begin by saying that if social and
institutional pathology in areas vital to human well-being constitute
attractive targets for scholarly inquiry, then the administration of
American criminal justice richly qualifies. We are confronted by prison
systems that, in some localities, regularly produce horrors as shocking
as anything given birth by the Gulag Archipelago. Even when conditions are somewhat less egregious, American correctional systems overcrowded, financially starved, out of sight and out of mind - fail
to achieve adequately any of their assigned objectives. In the great
majority of instances, our system of courts no longer adjudicates guilt
but rather processes cases. Furthermore, the processing is often unguided by anything remotely approaching the rule of law. We administer a program of capital punishment, one of the latent functions of
which appears to be to remove from our sight and concern a population
of violently insane or near-insane persons. The litany need not be
enlarged. Generally, the system regularly fails in its preventive and
incapacitative functions; is most imperfectly constrained by the principles of legality; and often denies human values of which the due process
concept represents one expression.
The contributions legal scholars can make to the mitigation of these
problems may prove peripheral. But a new emphasis could well produce lively and even useful results. Would it not be interesting, for
example, if a number of bright young law teachers concentrated seriously for a time on how to make American law enforcement more
efficient? By "efficient" I mean more effective in apprehending and
convicting persons who should be subjected to criminal restraints and
sanctions. To the old-line liberal the suggestion will likely seem fantastic and in bad taste. I recall a view expressed in the Vietnam era by
a number of criminologists that research funding for studies of police
operations should be rejected on grounds of conscience. To them, the
police were the adversaries of right-thinking persons and to advance
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their efficiency through research was to strengthen the forces of reaction.1o
Yet, it must now be clear that liberal aspirations are among the
first to wither in a society that believes the security and physical
integrity of its members are at risk because of crime. The typical
liberal insouciance about law enforcement is not shared by the public
and it is not surprising that the public has turned to candidates at
the other extreme of the political spectrum who take the crime problem
seriously or who say they do. It would be difficult to point to a more
de-liberalizing influence on American public life than the widespread
perception of rampant criminality. Exploitation of the crime issue by
the prevailing candidate in the presidential election of 1968 may well
have determined its outcome. Those not involved in more productive
activity may find it beguiling to speculate on what the consequences
for American society could have been had the election gone the other
way, which it very nearly did.
This is not the appropriate forum for proposing an agenda for
criminal justice research, but perhaps a few additional areas for inquiry
can be suggested. The problems of prison overcrowding are ubiquitous.
Can non-custodial programs for even serious offenders be devised that
adequately insure the public safety and, at the same time, employ
surveillance techniques consistent with the essential humanity of convicted persons? Again, are some appellate court judges, influenced by
the strong law-enforcement sentiments of the community, improperly
sustaining criminal convictions through the abusive use of "harmless
error" doctrines? One investigator has suggested that the standards
for affirmance in civil cases may have become stricter than those
applied in criminal cases involving issues of human life and liberty."
Again, the effort to introduce a semblance of the rule of law into the
processes of criminal sentencing is approaching a crisis both at federal
and state levels. ' Some law professors are contributing to these current deliberations. Perhaps more should be.

10. Comments on such attitudes may be found in Bayley, The Police and Political Change
in Comparative Perspective, 6 LAw & Soc. REV. 91 (1971); Gardiner, Research Models in Law
Enforcement, 6 LAw & Soc. REv. 223, 229; Sykes, The Future of Criminality, 15 ALI. BEHAV.
Sci. 417 (1972).
11. Davies, Affirmed: A Study of Criminal Appeals and Decision-Making Norms in a
CaliforniaCourt of Appeal, 1982 Ai. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543, 631.
12. Note the criticism directed to the preliminary draft of sentencing guidelines issued by
the United States Sentencing Commission. Sentencing Commission's FirstEffort Receives Outpouring of Criticism, 40 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 2223 (Dec. 17, 1986).
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We have no serious problem in stating our objective. What we
seek, in the words of the late Max Radin, is a juster justice and a
more lawful law. 13 Our problem is one of strategy. The course I have
suggested would remove Supreme Court case analysis from the central
focus of criminal justice research and elevate more firmly into the
mainstream, issues centered in the legislative and administrative processes. This proposal entails acquiring a greater command of techniques of social inquiry, which the law schools have been talking about
since the end of the First World War, and a greater tolerance of
interdisciplinary effort. All of these things and more are now going
forward at varying levels of intensity in the law schools. But more
needs to be done and more members of law faculties need to be doing
them. Even if these familiar prescriptions were accepted, no one can
warrant that the resulting impact on the pathologies of criminal justice
would be anything but small. But in these times, the possibility of
even small steps toward a fuller realization of the values to which this
Conference is dedicated is one to be sought and cherished.

13. Radin, A JusterJustice, a More Lawful Law, in ESSAYS
537-64 (1927).

IN HONOR OF O.K. MCMUR-
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